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Abstract How do hosts of digital markets exercise control over

sellers? Our three-case study, set in India, reveals that seller
control portfolios used by large digital market hosts differ from
control portfolios in other contexts (reported in prior research).
The platform host neither preselects nor hires most sellers; this
limits hosts’ control options. The platform supports many shortduration transactions, yet some related processes take place
offline – again limiting hosts’ control options. In this context of
many-sellers, many-buyers, digital market hosts (similar to other
controllers) attempt to balance formal and informal controls. By
identifying specific control mechanisms that hosts utilize, our
study findings provide a useful foundation to support further
research on control challenges in digital markets and other digital
platforms.
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1

Introduction

Control is both necessary and insufficient to digital platform success (Tiwana et al.
2010; Buchwald et al. 2014, Shafiei Gol et al. 2019). A digital market is a digital
platform that connects buyers and sellers via their computers or mobile devices.
Digital market hosts confront several control challenges. Sellers are not platform
employees, and most sellers are independent entities; they voluntarily participate and
may exit at any time. Unlike many other digital platforms, on a digital market many
sales transactions involve both on-platform and off-platform processes. Because of
this, the platform host's control leverage is limited (Felin & Zenger 2014). Their
control authority is further constrained by the fact that hosts and sellers are not colocated (difficult to observe off-platform behavior). Reflecting these and other
concerns, prior studies indicate that many platform hosts try to coax participants to
align with platform priorities (Parker & Van Alstyne 2018), such as by orchestrating
participants' interactions (Brown & Grant 2005; Tiwana 2014). Most platform hosts
aim to strike a balance between tight and loose control, and between attracting and
controlling buyers and sellers (de Reuver et al. 2018, Parker & Van Alstyne 2018).
Some helpful automated controls are embedded in digital platform software (Parker
& Van Alstyne 2018), and hosts also have the option of evicting participants who
misbehave (Parker & Van Alstyne 2018; Aulkemeier et al. 2019). Since eviction is a
last resort, it would be helpful to chronicle in detail how digital market platform
hosts actually exercise control over sellers, by closely examining their seller control
portfolios, and circumstances that influence which controls are used and when. A
recent study (Croitor et al. 2021) investigated sellers' perceptions about digital market
hosts' use of two formal and informal control modes (described below). However,
to date no prior in-depth study has comprehensively examined how digital market
hosts exercise control over sellers. Thus, our three-case study posed the following
research question: How do digital market hosts exercise control over participating sellers?
1.1

Brief Overview of Prior Control Research

An organization's portfolio of manual and computer-based control mechanisms
aims to prevent, detect, and correct adverse events, in ways that align with strategic
and operational priorities for organizational control (Cardinal et al. 2017),
accounting control (Gelinas & Dull 2008), or IS control (Kirsch et al. 2002;
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Choudhury & Sabherwal 2003; Heiskanen et al. 2014; Remus & Wiener 2012,
Wiener et al. 2019). Prior studies categorize control mechanisms in two modes: 1)
formal (process controls and outcome controls) and 2) informal (relational controls
and mechanisms that support self-control) (Chua et al. 2012; Merchant & Van der
Stede 2017). Until recently, prior platform studies articulated control challenges and
offered guidance on balancing control portfolios in terms of these higher-level
control modes; most prior platform control studies did not closely investigate the
specific formal and informal control mechanisms hosts used to achieve balanced
control (Yoo et al. 2012; Halckenhaeusser et al. 2020).
A survey of sellers on Amazon and Etsy (Croiter et al. 2021) reveals that control
perceived to be strict (e.g., screening mechanisms that block undesired sellers)
negatively affect sellers' intrinsic motivation, their perceptions of platform
usefulness, and their satisfaction with the platform. Informal relational controls -what Ouchi (1980) referred to as Clan Control -- positively influenced seller
perceptions. Croitor et al. contributed helpful early findings on sellers' attitudes
about specific controls, and their behavioral intentions. A recent literature review
(Danani, 2021) called for in-depth comprehensive examination of specific control
mechanisms that digital market hosts use to exercise control over sellers.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe our
research method. After presenting findings from our three-case study in Section 3,
we briefly discuss those findings which are consistent with prior control studies, and
point to other findings which uniquely reflect the digital market context. In Section
4 we discussion contributions, study limitations, and future research opportunities.
2

Research Method

Case research is appropriate for learning ‘how’ and ‘why’ managerial phenomena
unfold in complex contexts (Yin 2009). Our three-case study sought to learn in detail
how digital market hosts exercise control over sellers. We identified three prominent
digital markets operating in India (home country of first author). Each digital market
serves many consumers and many sellers. MC, GC, and FC (companies anonymized)
are each at a mature stage of operations (neither startup nor in decline). Each digital
market connects many consumers with 100,000 or more sellers, offering many
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products. From left to right, Table 1 summarizes key features of these three digital
market cases, in the order in which we gathered data.
For each case, semi-structured interviews were conducted with an operations
manager, merchant manager, operations head, and merchant head. Snowball
sampling led us to other interviewees. Interview and site observation notes were
typed within 24 hours and corroborated/triangulated case findings were confirmed
with each firm’s operations manager and also with owners of some seller firms. 12
interviews were conducted at MC , 12 at GC; 9 at FC. Interview findings were
compared with more than 360 company resources, including training materials,
policy documents, manuals, dashboards, digital communications, and observed
system interfaces. Here are two triangulation examples: 1) A content manager’s
interview was corroborated with MC's catalogue creation guideline documents. 2)
An operations manager interview was corroborated with training documents, seller
portal and operations guideline documents.
Table 1: Three Digital Market Hosts

MultiCart (MC)
October 2018--Jan 2019
Launched 2007
80M product SKUs
100,000 sellers
100M + consumers

GlobalCart (GC)
January 2017-- July 2018
Launched 2012
100M + product SKUs
400,000 sellers
120,000 active sellers
150M + consumers

FastCart (FC)
March 2019--May 2019
Launched 2010
60M + product SKUs
300,000 sellers
60% to 75% active sellers
10M + consumers

In 2007 MC targeted a
niche market. Later it
expanded into electronics,
apparel, appliances, books,
toys, other consumer
products, and groceries.
Today it targets consumers
all over India.

GC operates in many
countries; this study
focused on its operations in
India. Its systems and
infrastructure connect small
to medium size mostlyindependent sellers with
consumers all over India.

FC does not produce or
trade any products under
its brand. Its logistics
infrastructure services 3000
Indian cities. FC targets
consumers in smaller
towns. It offers low-price
high-volume products.
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Our analysis utilized both a positivist lens (we coded case data for known control
mechanisms, classified in informal or formal control modes), and a grounded theory
lens (we identified control mechanisms not discussed in prior studies and, iterating
between data collection and analysis, we identified new control themes). Thus, both
open and axial coding described each organization’s control portfolio. For example,
three open codes – specify delivery milestones, specify target timeframe, clearly defined interaction
success criteria -- were grouped into an axial code: Clearly defined performance criteria.
When necessary, we re-contacted interviewees to clarify details and obtain
supporting documents (e.g., after analysing a merchant manager interview, we asked
this interviewee to clarify details about performance metrics and evaluation criteria).
Interview findings were corroborated via primary-source or secondary-source
documents and other interviews. This helpful triangulation led us to modify some
initial concepts. For example: we saw that MC training documents and guidelines
transferred process knowledge to sellers. Later, we obtained evidence indicating that
training did help sellers perform effectively. Thus, we mapped training to both
formal process control and informal self-control.
3

Study Findings

The study findings revealed that hosts' seller control portfolios are comprised of
control mechanisms implemented at three levels: system (automated control
mechanisms), participants (control exerted by host employees, consumers, peer
sellers and seller themselves) and host firm (policies, initiatives, values and culture).
Figure 1, a Digital Market Seller Control Framework, summarizes three broad levels
of control mechanisms (automated, participant-level, host firm-level), mapped to
formal and informal control modes, and influencing consumer-seller interactions.
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Figure 1: Digital Market Platform Seller Control Framework

Table 2 (shaded in grey) summarizes conventional (single-mode) formal and
informal seller controls identified in the three cases. Table 3 (not shaded)
summarizes hybrid (multi-mode or multi-mechanism) controls in the three cases.
Table 2 Three-Case Comparison: Single-Mode Controls in Digital Market Platforms

Mechanism

Mode

MC

GC

FC

√

Formal Controls
OC: Outcome control PC: Process Control
a: automated f: firm p: participant
Verify adherence to catalogue guidelines, participation
terms

PC a, p

√

√

Measure rate of order acceptance by seller

OC a

√

√ NO

Measure consumer returns (indirectly gauge product
quality)

OC a

√

√ NO

Measure product quality through customer returns

OC a,
p

√

√ NO

Measure consumer satisfaction on order cycle

OC a

√

√

√
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Measure seller order (value + volume) in a given
period

OC a

√

√ NO

Measure consumer satisfaction on query/issue
resolution

OC a,
p

√

√

Measure number of completed returns request

OC a

√

√ NO

Support sellers through community platform

RC p, f

√

√ NO

Assist sellers with registration, catalogue creation, other
setup

RC p

√

√

√

Assist sellers with issue resolution

RC p

√

√

√

Connect with seller through calls and meetings

RC p

√

√

√

Encourage sellers to recruit new sellers to the platform

RC p

NO

√ NO

Organize seller group events

RC f

√

√ NO
+

Training: platform norms, values and objectives

RC f

√

√

Sellers decide re pricing, promotion, QC, packaging,
shipping

SC p

√

√

Link financial benefits with order performance

SC a, p

√

√ NO

√

Informal Controls
RC: Relational Control; SC: Support of Self-Control

√
√

Most formal controls are enacted via automated systems. An MC operations
manager stated that automated controls monitor consumers' product return
requests, and that “we do not monitor if the seller packed the right product, as
ordered by the consumer.” GC’s operations manager said “For every order,
performance against checkpoint parameters is recorded. The system calculates
average value [for] a 30-day [period].”
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Table 3 Three-Case Comparison: Hybrid Controls (multiple mechanisms/modes per
control)

Mechanism

Mode

MC

GC

FC

Measure time to pack and ship

PC a,
OC a

√

√

√

Measure time to deliver to end consumer

PC a,
OC a

√

√

NO

Measure pickup reattempt rate

PC a,
OC a

N
O

√

NO

Measure time taken to resolve consumer query/issue

PC a,
OC

√

√

√

Measure time taken to process refunds on returns
request

PC,
OC

√

√

NO

Create promotional events

RC,
SC

√

√ NO
+

Organize seller appreciation events

RC,
SC

√

√
+

Promote seller success stories

RC,
SC

√

√ NO
+

Provide access to comprehensive training material

RC,
SC

√

√

√

Best practices training: QC, packaging, shipping, etc.

RC,
SC

√

√

NO

SC,
PC

√

√

√

Controls that Combine 2 Formal Modes
PC: process control; OC: outcome control

Controls that Combine 2 Informal Modes
RC: relational control; SC: support for self-control

√

Controls that Combine Formal and Informal Modes
Training: order delivery, queries, returns), performance
criteria

S. Danani & J. L. Gogan:
How Digital Market Hosts Control Sellers

217

Automatically cancel order if not shipped on time

SC,
PC

√

√

√

Display system-generated seller service rating

OC,
SC

√

√

NO

Prominently display high performing sellers’ products

OC,
SC

√

√

NO

Prominently display products highly rated by consumers

OC,
SC

√

√

NO

Hosts rely on employee teams to manually measure sellers' content quality, and rely
on consumers to judge sellers' product and service quality. All three hosts encourage
consumers to evaluate sellers via quantitative and qualitative ratings of product
quality, service experience, and seller query resolution. These ratings are displayed
on or linked to sellers' product listing pages). Consumer evaluations weigh heavily
in hosts’ overall seller ratings (along with sellers' sales per evaluation period.
All sellers receive training that explains terminology, processes and instructions. MC
and GC community portals target all sellers with these resources. Other informal
controls aim to build relationships with sellers. Host teams attempt to keep sellers
engaged with their platform (participant-level relational controls). For example, MC
and GC invite high-performing sellers to local city chapter events. “Sellers who
perform well are very important for us,” said an MC Operations Manger. “We need
to … support them if there is an issue.” Awards and recognition events (firm-level
controls) also aim to strengthen high performing sellers' association with the
platform. A host merchant coordinator organizes meetings, calls, awards events,
advanced training seminars and other events. MC merchant coordinator: “We meet
up with them, one to one or in a group setting, region-wise. ”
Other control mechanisms encourage seller self-control, and these intertwine with
formal controls, such as performance-triggered rewards and penalties. MC's
Operations Manager stated that sellers “control their performance. We openly
display their performance report card … [Sellers try to] keep their consumers happy
and get good ratings.” FC manager: “The weighted average of customer ratings for
a seller is displayed next to seller name on every product listing. Future customers
can view the rating, identify the reason ...” Hosts respond to poor performance with
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warnings or penalties. GC Operations Manager: “We observe [a problematic seller]
for a fixed number of days. If performance does not improve, we completely
deactivate the seller account and remove all listings.”
4

Contributions, Limitations and Directions for Further Researc

The three cases reveal that hosts use many formal and informal controls, including
providing resources that enable seller self-control. Hosts also deputize consumers to
exercise control over sellers, through quantitative ratings and qualitative feedback.
Consistent with the ‘Goldilocks’ challenge (Ghazawneh & Henfridsson 2013), hosts
aim for balance; that is, overall control that is neither too-tight nor too-loose (Tiwana
2014; Benlian et al. 2015). In digital markets, the Goldilocks challenge appears to be
partly influenced by interdependence among hosts, sellers and buyers, and partly
influenced by the fact that sellers and consumers are only loosely tied to the market
platform (they can buy or sell elsewhere). In this interdependent yet loosely-coupled
context, hosts apply tight system-based controls, and authorize consumers to
exercise tight control by evaluating sellers' product and service quality. Hosts offset
tight controls with looser informal relational controls and by mechanisms that
support seller self-control. We believe a similar balancing of formal/informal and
preventive/detective controls likely applies in other contexts characterized by both
interdependence and loose coupling -- such as platforms that support ride-sharing,
short-term home rentals and other 'sharing economy' services. Future in-depth and
holistic case studies set in these other digital platform contexts are still needed.
Our study was based in India, which limits the generalizability of our findings. Future
case studies can usefully focus on culturally-different contexts like Europe, North
or South America, East Asia, and Africa. An embedded-cases study of a huge
multinational like Amazon or AliBaba could inevestigate why and to what extent
controls are chosen and exercised differently by headquarters versus managers in
different regions. Our study provides a helpful foundation for future case studies as
well as large-sample surveys investigating hosts' reliance on specific seller control
mechanisms (in differently-configured control portfolios).
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Our study did not directly examine how specific controls affect seller employees'
attitudes or behaviour (an important early contribution of Croitor et al. 2021). In
future studies, it would be helpful to take a 3600 view of stakeholder responses to a
broader set of formal and informal control mechanisms (important, since hosts need
to fairly balance sellers’ and consumers’ interests). Studies informed by servicedominant logic (Lusch & Nambisan 2015) could helpfully explore whether and how
value cocreation (or inadvertent value destruction) is associated with differentlyconfigured digital platform control portfolios.
In our three cases, hosts focused on building relationships with high-performing
sellers. As for high-potential (but as yet under-performing) sellers (e.g., those serving
small but profitable market niches or offering innovative products which consumers
do not yet understand): our findings suggest that digital market hosts adopt a 'sink
or swim' approach. Perhaps this is because a seller's success potential is hard to spot.
Stronger data analytics might help hosts identify high-potential sellers by attending
to faint signals that point to consumer acceptance and likely profitability in small
market niches. Future design-science studies could contribute, by testing alternative
analytic techniques that may strengthen those faint signals.
Our three-case study revealed that digital market hosts allow sellers to decide how
to carry out many processes (on-platform and off-platform). Advanced information
systems and supporting infra-structures might in future enable hosts to exercise
tighter automated control. Our case study provides a basis for comparison with
future studies that could chronicle whether and how host control changes as smarter
systems (supported by artificial intelligence, blockchains, etc.) take on additional
control functions, and also chronicle how host employees, sellers and consumers
react to such changes. Given the rapid evolution of ICT, many future studies
utilizing multiple research methods, are needed, to continue to shed helpful light on
mechanisms of control in digital markets and on other digital platforms.
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